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America's cities bear an increasingly heavy burden of
caring for the nation's poor. As they struggle to meet
their citizens' budgetary demands, poverty-related ex-
penditures take up a disproportionately large share of
scarce funds. To compound the problem, cities receive
ever-decreasing help from state and federal govern-
ments.
One reason for the increased burden on cities is the
concentration of poverty in cities, brought about in
part by suburban exclusionary zoning. Because suburbs
do not accept their fair share of regional poverty they
should contribute financially to the care of the region's
poor, who are concentrated in cities.
The author proposes a model for equitable regional
redistribution of poverty-related expenses. This model
will overcome legal constrains while not bowing to
political resistance. The proposed model would create
a state agency to redistribute revenue across regions
to pay for local poverty-related expenditures.
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"Where dwelle ye, if it to tell be?
'In the suburbes of a toun' said he"
Chaucer, Canterbury Tales
I. INTRODUCTION
Suburbs, the population ring surrounding a city, have evolved
from the time of Chaucer. In seventeenth century England, the
suburbs were the home of the poor and disenfranchised.' By
the turn of the twentieth century, however, American suburbs
had become an exclusive haven for the very wealthy.2 Today,
in 1995, the middle class dominates American suburbs.3
Detached, single-family homes in the suburbs, with well man-
icured lawns, are the hallmark of American middle class success.
But down the road from the tranquil life of the suburbs lies the
city, which houses not only the residents who chose to live
there, but also those who are economically prevented from living
in the suburbs: the poorer members of our society. As poverty
becomes more concentrated in the urban core, cities struggle to
provide evermore expensive services to those who are evermore
less able to pay.
City budget directors and mayors face a circular dilemma.
More revenue is desperately needed. Increasing taxes, however,
ignites middle class flight, leaving the city with a sizably smaller
tax base. 4
A region's poorer residents are increasingly concentrated in
cities.5 Thus, suburban residents do not pay for poverty-related
1. JOHN R. STILGOE, BORDERLAND: ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SUBURB,
1820-1939, 1-2 (1988). Stilgoe's description of the historical meaning of the
suburb mirrors the common image of the modern city: "Always suburban
connoted inferiority, ... [diependent, forlorn ... ." Id. at 1.
2. Peter Dreier, American Ur,6an Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions,
71 N.C.L. REv. 1351, 1376 (1993) ("Since World War II, the United States
has witnessed one of the most dramatic population shifts in its history - the
movement of Americans from cities to suburbs.").
3. See ST ILoE, supra note 1, at 2 ("If opinion polls prove accurate,
suburbs represent the good life, the life of the dream, the dream of happiness
in a single-family house in an attractive community."). No geographic-political
entity, either suburb or city, is an absolute economic monolith. Pockets of
poverty exist in the suburbs. Indeed, some of the older inner ring suburbs of
American cities have more in common with the central city than they do with
their suburban brethren.
4. Dreier, supra note 2, at 1372 (noting that city leaders are caught in a
"fiscal catch-22" - the poor residents cannot afford to pay higher taxes or
fees, but imposing higher taxes on affluent residents or businesses will drive
them out of the city, thus aggravating the fiscal crisis).
5. See infra notes 17-20, 58-62 and accompanying text.
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expenses in the same proportion that taxpayers in the city do 6
Regional redistribution of poverty-related expenses can help ease
cities' disproportionate burden of caring for the region's poor.
The suburbs should either allow the poor into their communities
or contribute to the expense of providing services to the impov-
erished.
This Article first outlines demographic and historical factors
that create economic disparities between cities and their suburbs.
Next, this Article discusses the effect of poverty on city budgets.
Finally, this Article explores the relationship between cities and
suburbs to highlight the importance of regional co-operation.
Based on this examination, this Article proposes a legal frame-
work for regional redistribution of poverty-related expenses,
focusing on both the legal and political constraints of such a
model.
II. REGIONAL SH=S AND RESULTING DISPAlUTIES
After World War II, population, political power, and eco-
nomic dominance flowed from the cities to the suburbs.7 These
regional shifts produced inequality in poverty-related expendi-
tures. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to chronicle
in detail the sociological and demographic impetus for these
changes, this Article will trace major shifts that continue to
impact upon city-suburban interaction.
A. Regional Population Shifts Between Cities and Suburbs
Prior to World War II, cities dominated their surrounding
suburbs in both economic and political clout.8 Whether through
annexation or sheer growth, cities commanded the bulk of the
population and, hence, taxing power in the region.9 Since World
6. See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1371 (noting that city residents require
and pay for more poverty-related social services than their suburban counter-
parts); see also infra part III.B.3 (discussing the adverse impact of mandated
social service programs on city finances).
7. See THOAAS B. EDsALL AND MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: TI
IMPACT OF RACE RIGHs AND TAXEs ON AMERICAN PoLmCs 229 (1991) (con-
cluding that "the nation is moving steadily toward a national politics that will
be dominated by the suburban vote"); see also William Schneider, The
Suburban Century Begins, ATLANTIC, July 1992, at 33-44 (arguing that chang-
ing demographics are moving American politics away from cities); Dreier,
supra note 2 at, 1354 (citing Schneider, supra at 33-44) ("We have begun a
'suburban century' in American politics, Schneider wrote, in which candidates
for national office, and for a majority of congressional seats, can ignore
urban America without paying a political price.").
8. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
9. Id.
19951
Washington University Open Scholarship
8 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
War II, however, such factors as government sponsored mort-
gage programs,10 interstate highways,"' and racial strife12 have
opened the flood gates and shifted the population from the
cities to the suburbs.
Since World War II, regional population dominance has re-
versed, leaving cities with a decreasing share of regional popu-
lation (see Chart 1). In 1950, 57 percent of people residing in
major metropolitan areas lived in cities and 43 percent lived in
the suburbs. 13 By 1990, however, cities' share of metropolitan
population plummeted to 37 percent and the suburban share
increased to 63 percent.'4
In addition to population movement to the suburbs, employ-
ment likewise shifted out of the central city. 5 The suburbs
frequently offer manufacturers cheaper land and labor. 6
10. Brian O'Connel, The Federal Role in the Suburban Boom, in SUBURBIA
RE-EXAMNmD 189 (Barbara Kelly, ed. 1989). For example, the Federal Housing
Authority (FHA) inspres home loans to qualified borrowers, thus eliminating
the lender's risk and providing lenders an incentive to make mortgage loans.
In the post World War II period, however, FHA lending criteria resulted in
a pronounced preference for lending for new construction rather than existing
structures. Because the new construction was more likely to be in the suburbs
than in the city, the program encouraged suburban growth. Id. See also
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABoRASS FRONTMR: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF AMER-
ICA 190-218 (1985) (noting that consumer choices were subsidized by federal
government policies which both pushed people out the cities and pulled them
into suburbs); Dreier, supra note 2, at 1377 (noting that federal housing
policies offered government-insured mortgages to whites in suburbs, but not
in cities).
11. O'Connel, supra note 10, at 187. The Interstate Highway system funded
by the federal government provided a web of roads that facilitated travel
between the city and the suburbs. Id. These highway systems cut commuting
time for workers, allowing them to live in the suburbs and work in the city.
Id. See also Dreier, supra note 2, at 1377 (noting that federal highway-building
policies "opened up the hinterlands to speculation and development.").
12. See CAROLYN ADAMS ET AL., PHnLADELIHIA: NEIOHBORHOODS, DMSIoN,
AND CONFLICT IN A PosTINusTiL. Crry 83 (1991) (describing the pattern of
racial hostility that induced whites to abandon Philadelphia for the suburbs).
See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1377 (noting that America's post World War II
suburban migration "is often described as the 'white flight' or 'suburban
exodus' of consumers anxious to leave troubled neighborhoods for greener
pastures.").
13. Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan
Suburbanization, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 135 (1993).
14. Id.
15. Anita A. Summers, A New Urban Strategy for America's Large Cities,
Table 2 (prepared for Association for Public Policy and Management) (October
28, 1994).
16. For example, Sears, Roebuck and Co. moved its merchandise group
headquarters and 5000 workers from central Chicago's Sears Tower to sub-
urban Hoffman Estates, Illinois. Sue Ellen Christian & Flynn Robberts, Sears'
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Suburban Experiment Set to Begin, Will the State Ever Recoup its $66 Million,
Cm. TRm., Aug. 2, 1992, at 1. Along with improvements in efficiency, the
company will benefit from $66 million in state incentive programs. Id.
17. Chart 1 was compiled by the author from data contained in Miesz-
kowski & Mills, supra note 13.
19951
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As population shifted from the city to the suburbs, a disparity
between the income levels of suburban and city residents devel-
oped. In 1960, the per capita income of city residents was 105
percent of that of suburbanites. 8 By 1980, it had dropped to
90 percent.' 9 During the 1980s, city residents' per capita income
continued to fall precipitously. By 1987, the per capita income
of city residents was only 59 percent of that of their suburban
neighbors. 20 In some cities, the disparity was even greater. For
example, in 1990, the per capita income of Philadelphia city
residents was 48 percent of their suburban neighbors. 2'
Analyzing the differences in median incomes of city and
suburban residents confirms the disparity. In 1970, the annual
median income of city residents nationwide was $8,100, while
the annual median income of suburban residents nationwide was
$9,650 - a difference of $1,550. 22 In 1981, the difference was
$3,500. 23 By 1991, a $6,142 difference existed between the me-
dian incomes of city and suburban residents.24 (See Chart 2)
These statistics show that the city is no longer the regional
wealth and population center it was before World War II. 2
B. Why the Shift?
What causes this shift? Why do more people, especially those
with economic means, choose to live in the suburbs, rather than
the city? Economist Charles Tiebout hypothesized that intra-
regional movers are merely consumers looking for the commu-
nity that best meets their demand for public goods. 26 Tiebout's
18. Larry C. Ledebur & William R. Barnes, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES,
Metropolitan Disparities and Economic Growth: City Distress and the Need
for a Federal Local Growth Package 1 (1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.; Farrell et al., The Economic Crisis of Urban America, Bus. WK.,
May 18, 1992, at 38, 42.
21. Steve Boman, Wide Approach to Cities' Woes, Suburbs Can't Wall
Themselves Off Professor Says, PH.A. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1992, at B17.
22. The author complied the statistics for urban-suburban income dispar-
ities from U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HoUsINO
AND URBAN DEV., AmERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR rm U.S., 1970-1991.
Hereinafter citations will refer to the AMERiCAN HOUSiNG SURVEY for the
appropriate year.
23. AmmIucAN HousING SURvEY, 1981.
24. AMERIcAN HOUsiNG SURVEY, 1991.
25. See generally LARRY H. LONG & DONALD C. DAHMANN, THE CirY-
SUBURB INCOME GAP: Is IT BEING NARROWED BY A BACK-TO-THE-CITY MOVE-
MENT? (1980) (concluding that a gentrification movement had not narrowed
regional income gaps by the late 1970s).
26. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 418 (1956) [hereinafter Tiebout, Pure Theory].
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theory holds that based on a community's revenue and expen-
diture patterns, consumers move to a community where the local
government "best satisfies [their] set of preferences. ' 28 Under
this theory, a consumer is better able to choose an appropriate
community as the number and variety of communities increase.29
The greater the number of communities and the greater the
variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully
realizing his preference position.
Consumers search for the community where the levels of taxes
and municipal expenditures mesh with their personal needs.
Rather than express their choice through the ballot box, con-
sumers "vote with their feet" and find that community which
most closely matches their desired bundle of services.3 0
Consumers compare the tax rate and expenditure patterns
within the city against those of its surrounding suburbs. Based
on this comparison, consumers choose the community with
affordable taxes that spends its tax monies in the way the
consumers desire.3 f Because cities spend a high percentage of
their budgets on poverty-related services,32 economically able
consumers choose to live in the suburbs, where they do not pay
for social services for which they have no use.33
C. Role of Exclusionary Zoning
The theory of "community shopping" assumes that consumers
can always attain the package of public services they desire. 4
Therefore, a municipality must either assure that the desired
bundle of services will be provided in the future, or else the
current clientele of residents will relocate. Municipalities use a
variety of methods to keep out those consumers who might alter
the package of services. One method of protecting this bundle
of community attributes is exclusionary zoning.35
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. This theory addresses only economic barriers and assumes away barriers
to movement based on race or ethnicity. In reality, certain consumers cannot
exercise their true choice of location. Racial and ethnic discrimination often
impedes an efficient housing market.
31. Tiebout, Pure Theory, supra note 26, at 424.
32. See infra part III.
33. Dreier, supra note 2, at 137. But see Robert P. Inman & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal Equity 92 HARv. L. Rv.
1662, 1675 (1979) (asserting that the wealthy demand more services than the
poor, using their mobility to acquire the optimum bundle).
34. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 33, at 1748-49. Inman & Rubinfeld
conclude that despite attempts to provide fiscal equality, wealthy families will
locate wherever they can find the services they desire. Id.
35. Exclusionary zoning is using the local land use laws to prevent entrance
of certain land uses into the community.
[Vol. 47:3
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The United States Supreme Court first recognized local gov-
ernment's ability to regulate land use in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Company.36 In Euclid, the Court determined that
zoning codes are a valid exercise of the police power when used
for the public welfare.37 The Euclid decision laid the legal
groundwork and justification for local zoning codes in the
United States, and empowered local governments (specifically in
suburbs) to act in their own (even if selfish) best interests by
erecting land use barriers to exclude undesirable uses and citi-
zens.
38
For example, if a local government wants to keep out lower
income housing, it can enact a zoning code that makes it difficult
for low income residents to affording housing. a9 Local govern-
ment can use a variety of formulas to achieve this goal. For
example, local governments can enact zoning codes which require
that each lot be of a minimum size; which mandate a maximum
density; which limit structures to a certain number of floors; or
which allow only a certain percentage of the lot to have imper-
vious covering.
Exclusionary zoning is aided because local governments can
comply with Euclid through a de minimis proof of public welfare
promotion. 4° Euclid allows zoning codes that benefit local resi-
dents, even if they exclude and discriminate against outsiders.
Such ordinances are unconstitutional only if shown to be "clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable [and having] no substantial relation
36. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, a property owner sued the village, a
suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 379-84. The property owner claimed that the village
zoning ordinance limited the market value of the tract. Id. at 384.
37. Id. at 387 ("The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws
and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect of the police
power, asserted for the public welfare.").
38. Id. at 389. The Court rejected the argument that the village could not
divert the city's natural development. The Court stated: "The village, though
physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with
powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits
of the organic law of its creation and the State and Federal Constitutions."
Id.
39. Development of lower income housing depends on high density con-
struction. For example, if an apartment rents for less money, absent some
sort of subsidy, there must be more rental units produced on the property to
justify development.
40. In Euclid, the Court recognized a broad range of permissible purposes
for zoning ordinances. These ranged from improving access by fire engines to
decreasing "noise and other conditions which produce or intensify nervous
disorders." 272 U.S. at 394. The Court suggested that banning apartment
houses might validly ensure children "the privilege of quiet and open spaces
for play . . . ." Id.
1995]
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to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." '4'
This zoning power is essential to the market efficiency de-
scribed in the Tiebout theory.42 If consumers do in fact shop
for the municipality that offers the optimal service "package,"
then municipalities must maintain that mix of services 3.4  By
using exclusionary zoning, suburbs can eliminate consumers who
might shift resources to social and welfare services that the
present residents do not want and for which they are unwilling
to pay.
Municipalities use zoning to achieve goals beyond the Euclid
Court's pastoral ideal. The Euclid Court blessed zoning as a
method to protect citizens against the encroachment of indus-
trialization.44 But zoning permits legally created residential eco-
nomic segregation. As one commentator noted, "land use law
has completely outgrown its original roots in nuisance - the
separation of inconsistent uses - and [has] become a form of
public utility regulation. ' 45 Called the "dark side of municipal
land use regulation," 46 exclusionary zoning is the "use of the
zoning power to advance the parochial interests of the munici-
pality at the expense of the surrounding region, and to establish
and perpetuate social and economic segregation." 47
Exclusionary zoning is rational for the individual suburban
consumer and municipality, but creates economic inefficiency
and disparity on the regional level. Rational economic behavior
on the individual and municipal levels depends on creation of
artificial (i.e., not market-derived) barriers such as exclusionary
41. 272 U.S. at 395.
42. See Stephen D. Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to
Exclusionary Zoning, 27 REAL PRop. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 61 (1992). Galowitz
concludes that without exclusionary zoning, communities cannot protect the
special bundles of services they provide. Id. See also Bruce W. Hamilton,
Taxes and the Tiebout Hypothesis: Some Empirical Evidence, in FIscAL ZoNINo
AND LAND USE CONmoo.s at 13 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds.
1975). The Tiebout argument for efficiency, however, is focused on the level
of individual municipalities. The argument fails to take into account whether
exclusionary zoning is efficient on regional level. See also Bruce W. Hamilton,
Capitalization of Interjurisdictional Differences in Local Tax Prices, 66 AM
Eco N. REv. 743 (1976) (proposing a mathematic model indicating that inter-jurisdictional differences in tax rates and public sector benefits are capitalized
into residential property values). See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
43. See Galowitz, supra note 42, at 60-61.
44. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
45. John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of
Affordable Housing Policies, 16 REAL EsT. L.J. 20, 33 (1987) [hereinafter
Payne, Rethinking Fair Share].
46. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
336 A.2d 713, 735 (N.J. 1975) (Pashman, J., concurring).
47. Id. See also infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text,
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zoning. The spill-over effect of these barriers, however, results
in the rest of the region bearing an economic burden that, but
for the erection of artificial barriers, would be borne propor-
tionately by all municipalities within the region. 48
Exclusionary zoning allows municipalities to take a "free ride"
on the payment of poverty-related expenditures at the expense
of other communities in the region. 49 Communities that cannot,
or choose not to, exclude low income residents must pay not
only for those who would choose to live there anyway, but also
for those who, but for the exclusionary zoning, would choose
to live in another community.5 0
Exclusionary zoning ordinances are attractive to politicians
because exclusionary zoning laws preserve the status quo." Those
who can vote want to prevent those who may change the service
package from entering their municipality. But those who may
want admission into the community and may change the service
package cannot vote. Thus, the costs of exclusionary zoning,
borne by the city, fall primarily on those who lack the ability
to vote for change in the suburbs. The benefits, conversely,
inure only to those who have the power of the suburban vote.5 2
III. THE EFFECT OF THE CITY BEARING A DISPROPORTIONATE
BURDEN OF REGIONAL POVERTY
The social and economic disparities between cities and sub-
urbs, enforced through exclusionary zoning, create a multiplicity
48. See Galowitz, supra note 42, at 68 (discussing the externalities asso-
ciated with exclusionary zoning). Galowitz concludes that "the 'rational'
community will enact exclusionary restrictions because they yield net benefits
at the local level. By contrast, regional governing bodies would reject such
restrictions because they ultimately yield net costs." Id. at 68-69.
49. Harold A. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compen-
sation for Exlusionary Zoning, 60 TEMPLE L. Q. 665, 668 (1987) [hereinafter
McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements].
50. Galowitz, supra note 42, at 71 ("[L]andlords and homeowners naturally
unite to further their common interest ... and can influence local governments
to enact zoning policies that effectively deny many individuals their choice of
residence.").
Property rights advocates claim that exclusionary zoning is a right of private
property owners. This theory, however, fails to take into consideration the
negative externalities imposed upon nonexcluding communities by exclusionary
zoning.
51. Cf. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements, supra note 49, at
672 (noting that critical legal theorists view the problems associated with
region-wide development (as opposed to local, municipal development) as a
result of the ends pursued by the political leadership of exclusionary munici-
palities).
52. See Galowitz, supra note 42, at 62 (discussing the political bias toward
exclusion).
19951
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of municipal service packages. These bundles of services vary
according to which side of the city line one resides. By erecting
barriers to protect their desired service packages, suburbanites
are cut off from the present worry of how services will be
delivered to those in the city who are unable to pay. This "out
of sight, out of mind" mentality leads, at best, to apathy and,
at worst, to hostility toward the urban poor.-3 As author Neal
Pierce pointed out, the "torn social fabric" separating cities
and suburbs "is rooted in historic anti-urbanism, overlain in
our time by ethnic and racial prejudices." 5 4
Middle-class flight leaves cities with a disproportionately ec-
onomically disadvantaged population. 55 As population and in-
come shift to the suburbs, cities must somehow still provide
services to those who are least able to pay. Increasingly, cities
are forced to raise taxes56 (an act of political suicide, which
gives further incentive to middle-class flight) or reallocate scarce
income between budget items.5 7
53. See NEAL PEIRcE, CTSTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A
comPETrnvE WORLD 17 (1993). See also Dreier, supra note 2, at 1360 (noting
that many suburbanites "seek to quarantine themselves from the economic
and social problems created by a troubled economy, widening income dispar-
ities, rising poverty, and the environmental and related problems" of the city).
54. Peirce, supra note 53, at 17.
Indeed, as James Rouse, Chairman of the Enterprise Foundation recognized:
"It has been said that poverty is not the real problem in America, that it is
affluence - rising affluence that brings with it detachment, separation,
indifference to the poor." James Rouse, Rational Visions Generate Energy to
Transform the Lives of the Poor 58 VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, 344-47
(1992).
55. See infra part III.A.
56. For example, when the Mayor of Memphis faced population loss and
escalating costs in 1993, he stated that he had to raise city taxes every year
since he took office. Ronald Smothers, City Seeks to Grow by Disappearing,
N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 18, 1993, at A10.
57. See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1372 (noting that city leaders are caught
in a "fiscal catch-22" - poor residents cannot afford to pay higher taxes or
fees, but imposing higher taxes on affluent residents or businesses might induce
them to leave, thus aggravating the fiscal crisis."); Susan S. Fainstein & Ann
Markusen, The Urban Policy Challenge: Integrating Across Social and Eco-
nomic Development Policy, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1463, 1463 (1993) ("The uprisings
that raged through Los Angeles in April 1992 propelled the issue of urban
policy on to the national agenda after a decade of neglect."). For example,
two days before the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the Los Angeles City Council
voted to take $48.3 million earmarked for its Community Redevelopment
Agency's low-income housing program to pay for added police and fire
services. Although the ensuing riots were not a direct result of this decision,
they were an outgrowth of the underlying problem of inadequate local resources
in America's urban centers. See Farrell et al., supra note 20, at 43 (describing
urban budget problems); see also Dreier, supra note 2, at 1371 ("To avert
fiscal collapse, many cities have closed schools, hospitals, health centers, police
[Vol. 47:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/2
REDISTRIBUTING URBAN POVERTY
A. Concentration of Poverty
It is not simply the existence of poverty that creates increased
financial burdens on cities, it is the concentration of the poverty
within the city.58 In 1960, approximately 40 million Americans
lived in poverty. 9 Thirty percent lived in cities.60 During the
1980s, however, poverty became increasingly concentrated in
America's cities.61 By 1991, 42 percent of America's 36 million
poor people lived in cities.'2 Although the absolute number of
people living in poverty throughout the U.S. decreased, cities'
proportionate burden of caring for America's poor has dramat-
ically increased.
B. Budgetary Problems of Cities and the Impact of Poverty-
Related Expenditures
The concentration of poverty stings cities most when the cost
of necessary public services exceeds available revenue. 3 The
budgetary cost of poverty-related expenses is more than just the
direct expenditures - it includes the impact of intergovernmental
transfers, unfunded federal and state mandates, and property
and income tax limitations.
1. Direct Costs
The municipal services provided to the poor are more expen-
sive, per capita, than those demanded by the middle class.64
stations, and fire stations. They have laid off essential employees and reduced
basic services, such as maintaining parks, repairing roads, and enforcing
housing and health codes.").
58. Galowitz, supra note 42, at 74 ("A concentration of low income
families, in poor quality urban housing, multiplies problems synergistically.").
59. BuREu or TnM C9msus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STLACT OF Tm U.S. 469 (113th ed. 1993).
60. Janet R. Pack, Poverty and Urban Expenditures, 7-8 (June 14, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author); Farrell et al., supra note
20, at 38.
61. Ledebur & Barnes, supra note 18, at 4. See also Dreier, supra note 2,
at 1364 ("The poor are increasingly concentrated in America's cities.").
62. See Farrell et al., swpra note 20, at 38.
63. See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1371. Dreier notes:
Cities, trapped by rising, costs shrinking resources, and unex-
pandable borders, are now confronting fiscal calamity. Many cities
face bankruptcy and are operating under severe austerity budgets.
In the past few years, Bridgeport, Connecticut, East St. Louis,
Illinois, and Chelsea, Massachusetts plunged into bankruptcy. A
number of other cities, including Philadelphia and New York,
teeter on the edge of insolvency.
Id.
64. The poor benefit more from expenditures on services like health care
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Estimates of the direct and indirect costs of urban poverty range
from $230 billion 65 to $750 billion" annually. The larger the
city, the more it spends on poverty-related expenses. 67 Cities
with populations between 500,000 and 1 million devote approx-
imately 13 percent of their budget to poverty-related expenses. 61
Cities with populations greater than one million, however, ded-
icate more than twenty-two percent of their budgets to poverty-
related expenditures.69
2. Intergovernmental Transfers
City budget deficits result in part from the paradox that many
to whom a large portion of the city's budget is allocated make
no contribution to revenues.70 In the past, cities could rely on
the federal and state governments to close this budget gap.7'
The amount of federal aid to cities today, however, is approx-
imately only 33 percent of what it was in 1970.72 Expressed as
a percentage of city budgets, federal aid is nearly 64 percent
below its 1980 level. 73 Additionally, the size of the city affects
the amount of intergovernmental transfers received.7 4 The
than street repairs. See Inman & Rebinfeld, supra note 33, at 1675. Providing
health care is more expensive than providing trash and sanitation services.
Similarly, the bureaucracy of a child welfare system is more expensive than
providing parks and recreation. Id.
65. Farrell et al., supra note 20, at 40; Pack, supra note 60, table 2.
66. Rouse, supra note 54, at 345.
67. Pack, supra note 60, at 7-8.
68. Id.
69. Id. at Table 3a. Seven cities are included in this group and the figures
are dominated by those for New York city. The remaining six cities are quite
heterogeneous in that three are joint city-county governments and three have
separate county governments with major expenditure responsibilities. Id.
70. See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1371-72 ("[T]he cost of providing public
services has increased. Beginning in the 1980s, three phenomena - homeless-
ness, crack cocaine, and AIDS - placed additional burdens on city services.
These trends were exacerbated by both federal and state governments' dramatic
cuts in fiscal assistance to local governments.").
71. Id. Dreier notes that during the Reagan and Bush administrations, the
federal government slashed federal aid to cities, "reversing five decades of
steady growth in federal urban assistance." Id. at 1383-84. See generally id.
at 1383-87 (describing specific cuts in assistance).
72. Boman, supra note 21, at B17.
73. Farrell et al., supra note 20, at 40. But see Martin M. Wooster, Alms
After the Storm, REAsoN, Oct. 1992, at 52. Wooster points out that blaming
middle-class flight on decreased federal spending is misleading and misses the
main culprit of city budget woes: bureaucratic bondage of poverty. Calling
the social service bureaucracy "poverty pimps," Wooster pinpoints the problem
as the lack of choice across economic lines. Id. at 53.
74. Pack, supra note 60, at 7-8.
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nation's largest cities have the lowest ratio of intergovernmental
transfer payments to per capita poverty expenditures.7 5
3. Unfunded Mandates
In addition to decreased federal and state aid, cities must
contend with the escalating costs of federally and state mandated
programs that are paid for by the city. 6 For example, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires that each county main-
tain certain levels of child welfare agency programs.7 7 The state,
however, has not fulfilled its obligation to fund these programs.7 1
Consequently, the City of Philadelphia must pay for the un-
funded mandate by transferring funds from other city depart-
ments, including its police, fire, and streets departments.7 9
4. Property Taxes
The revenue generator of local governments - real property
taxes - exacerbates the problem.Y° Low property values tie the
hands of the city and severely limit city budgets even when
property tax rates are relatively high.' It stands to reason that,
given the same tax rate, the lower the value of the real estate
taxed, the less revenue generated. Conversely, if the value of
the real estate appreciates, the tax revenue generated will likewise
increase, even without an increase of the tax rate. Against this
backdrop, it is pertinent to note that the rate of appreciation
between city and suburban owner-occupied housing is uneven.
Through the 1970s and early 1980s, city and suburban homes
appreciated at approximately the same pace.8 2 In the mid-1980s,
however, suburban home values grew at a much faster rate than
75. Id.
76. Edward Rendell, Rendell Outlines His Plan for a "New Urban Agenda,"
PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 15, 1994, at A23 (Edward Rendell is the mayor of the
city of Philadelphia).
77. Thomas Turcol, Rendell Offers Plan to Extend Child- Welfare Funds,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 13, 1992, at B3.
78. Id.
79. Id. Another example is the federal government's requirement that the
city comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act by putting in curb cuts
and ramps which could cost Philadelphia taxpayers $140 million. Rendell,
supra note 76, at A23. This is more than three time the entire amount
Philadelphia budgeted for street resurfacing and reconstruction in fiscal 1994.
Id.
80. For example, the City of Richmond, Virginia derived more than 30%
of its income from this source in fiscal year 92-93. FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF
THE CITY OF RICHMoND FOR FISCAL YEAR 1992-93, at 18.
81. Galowitz, supra note 42, at 74.
82. AMERIcAN HousiNG SURVEY, 1970-1983.
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city home values . 4 In 1970, there was a $4,400 difference
between the mean value of a home in the suburbs and a similar
home in the city (see Chart 3). 85 As recently as 1985, this
difference was $11,233. s1 In 1987, however, the rate of appre-
ciation of suburban homes soared into the double digits, to 12.5
percent,8 7 and remained high in 1989, at 13.5 percent 8 This
rate of appreciation out-paced the appreciation rate in the city
market (9.5 percent in 198789 and 9.75 percent in 1989), 90 cata-
pulting the difference in median home value to $20,575 in 1991.91
5. Income Taxes
A city that relies on income tax as a revenue generator is
likewise disadvantaged as compared to its suburban counter-
parts. Income is taxed according to residence. 92 Even a city with
a strong employment base will be constrained if the majority of
the work force leaves the city at day's end for their homes in
the suburbs. For example, the City of Baltimore is the "eco-
nomic and employment engine" behind that region's economy. 93
But even a robust economy in Baltimore does not translate into
increased prosperity for the city, because the highly paid workers
tend to live in the suburbs and income is taxed according to
residence.94 Ironically, the addition of "imported" income tax
revenues permit the suburbs to offer even lower property taxes.95
As a result of the concentration of poverty in cities and
budgetary problems, cities, which house the majority of a met-
84. AImucAN Housma S EY, 1983-1987.
85. AMERICAN HousINo SURVEY, 1970.
86. AMERIcAN HousiNG SURVEY, 1985.
87. AMERIcAN Housing SuRvEy, 1987.
88. AImICAN Housmo SUREy, 1989.
89. AmERICAN HousiNG SURVEY, 1987.
90. AMEIcAN HousmG SURVEY, 1989.
91. AmERicAN HOUSING SURVEy, 1991.
92. An income tax is a tax imposed by a government on income from
whatever source wherever it is earned, based upon the taxpayer's residence.
This is different than a wage tax, which is imposed on income earned within
the taxing entity. See infra part IV.B (discussing wage taxes). See, e.g., Mark
K. Joseph, Baltimore Makes the Suburbs Richer, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 13,
1991, at 3M (describing how Baltimore, despite being the centerpiece of the
region's economy, faces fiscal problems due to revenue inadequacies).
93. Joseph, supra note 92, at 3M.
94. The alternative is to impose a city wage tax that will allow the city to
tap income earned in the city by non-residents. If there is not tax parity
between the suburbs and the city, however, the imposition of the wage tax
will tend to drive jobs outside the city. For example, the disproportionately
high city wage tax in Philadelphia has been blamed for fueling the movement
of jobs to the suburbs. Robert P. Inman, Can Philadelphia Escape its Fiscal
Crisis with Another Tax Increase? Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 11-12
(published by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia).
95. Joseph, supra note 92, at 3M.
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ropolftan region's poor,96 must pay for poverty-related services
without help from the suburbs. While cities perform the "serv-
ice" of keeping low income housing, crime, free health services
and other social services out of the suburbs, they receive nothing
in return from the suburbs.
IV. INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN CITIEs AND THEIm SUBURBS
Suburbs erect barriers to the poor to avoid the immediate
cost of poverty-related services,. Exclusionary zoning policies do
not, however, protect suburbs from poverty-related problems.
The poverty-related problems that cripple the central city also
tend to weaken the entire region.
A. Regional Impact of Declining Cities
A parochial view of city versus suburbs is naive. Cities and
suburbs have common stakes in shared economies. The fate of
a municipality depends not on how well it competes with others
in its region but on how well its region competes with other
regions in the United States and internationally. 97
Economic disparity between a city and its suburbs erodes the
vitality of the regional economy. Studies indicate an inverse
relationship between the level of city-suburb economic disparity
and metropolitan economic performance. 98 Metropolitan regions
with the widest city-suburb economic disparities achieve the
lowest rates of economic growth and prosperity. 9 Consequently,
policies of exclusionary zoning, while facially appealing to sub-
urbs because they erect barriers to poverty, are actually detri-
mental to suburban growth and economic health.'0 Exclusionary
96. See supra part III.A.
97. See David R. Boldt, City and Suburb Cooperation Works for Benefit
of Both, PHIMADELPHIA INQUIrMR, Dec. 19, 1993, at C5 (describing the "po-
tential for enrichment that exists if suburbs and city seek to prosper together");
see also Dixie O'Connor, Hanging Together: Municipalities Discover Regional
Cooperation Is Key to Success, So. Crry, Apr. 1993, at 1, 8-9 (noting that
when BMW was searching for the site for its new North American manufac-
turing plant, the 13 counties combined and created the Carolinas Partnership,
which presented a comprehensive regional marketing and site plan).
98. See generally Ledebur & Barnes, supra note 18, at 5-6.
99. Cf. Dreier, supra note 2, at 1359; Richard Voith, City and Suburban
Growth: Substitutes or Compliments? Bus. Rnv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21, 27
(published by Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) (describing the positive
correlation between declining cities and slowly growing suburbs).
100. City problems have no respect for political boundaries. For example,
crime, and the multiplier effect of crime, does not stop at the city line. See
Michael A. Stegman, National Urban Policy Revisited, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1737,
1748 ("Rising crime rates are not exclusive to our largest cities."). Thus, when
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zoning results in a financially weakened city and decreased
regional economic vitality. Thus, despite the best efforts of
suburbanites, cities and suburbs are interdependent and share
common fates.
B. Resistance to Regional Co-Operation
Although regional co-operation is the key to the economic
success of interdependent regions, suburban and city political
leaders alike, with a few notable exceptions, 10 resist regional
co-operation. 12 Suburban residents' and lawmakers' resistance
reflects a fear that the suburbs will lose their unique "local
revenue-expenditure patterns" as the city and suburbs merge
into a interconnected region. 0 In essence, regional co-operation
would erase the benefits of the economic cost-benefit analysis
that led homeowners to choose houses in the suburbs. Co-
operation negates the goal of exclusionary zoning, which is to
free suburbanites from the economic cost of problems by zoning
those problems out of their neighborhood. 1' 4
On a more practical level, suburban residents view regional
co-operation as a way for the city to get tax dollars through its
back door, and they fear losing control over how their tax
dollars are spent. 05 Building on a basic distrust of government
the city of West Palm Beach enacted a surcharge on water sold to suburban
Palm Beach to finance police protection in West Palm Beach, the mayor of
West Palm Beach commented: "Our crime worries them. I keep hearing from
them [that] if we fall apart because of our crime, it would hurt them
dramatically." Joel Engelhardt and Tim O'Melia, Water Surcharge on Palm
Beach Could Pay for West Palm Officers, P. M BEACH POST, Mar. 12, 1994,
at IA. See also supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the inappro-
priateness of suburbanites' "out of sight, out of mind" mentality).
101. See infra notes 131, 164 and accompanying text (discussing supporters
of regionalism). See also Rob Gurwitt, The Painful Truth About Cities and
Suburbs: They Need Each Other, GovaNNo, Feb. 1992, at 56, 58 (quoting
John Amberger, executive director of the Southeast Michigan Council of
Governments) ("[As a region] you pay one way or another" for the social
problems of a declining central city.").
In addition, at least one study indicates that suburban homeowners may
believe that a long-term economic decline in the central city will similarly
reduce the market value of their suburban property. Dreier, supra note 2, at
1358-59 (citing Arthur S. Goldberg, Americans and Their Cities: Solicitude
and Support, in IN THE NATiONAL INTEREST: THE 1990 URBAN SuMwT (Ronald
Berkman et al. eds., 1992).
102. See Engelhardt and O'Mella, supra note 100, at IA (noting that in
response to the proposed West Palm Beach water surcharge, the Town Council
President of Palm Beach stated, "if they have budget problems, they shouldn't
be sticking their hands in our pockets to solve them").
103. Tiebout, Pure Theory, supra note 26, at 423.
104. See supra part II.C.
105. Boldt, supra note 97, at C5.
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in general and city government in particular, "suburbanites
resent it when politicians take their money and use it to solve
other people's problems, especially when they don't believe that
government can actually solve these problems."'' 1
Recognition of regional interdependence, likewise, gets a luke-
warm reception from some city political leaders. 1°0 These leaders,
often members of racial minority groups, fear that co-operation
will dilute their political power."°8 They fear co-operation because
it may lead to shared decision making authority between city
and suburban governments with vastly different constituencies. 109
How, then, can suburban officials, city leaders, and residents
be persuaded that regional co-operation for the payment of
poverty-related expenses is mutually beneficial? "The trick, of
course, is to find a way of arguing that the benefits of coop-
eration will outweigh the costs."'' °
V. A MODEL OF REGIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF POVERTY-
RELATED ExPENSES
The answer lies in a solution that uses regional tax dollars to
pay for regional poverty-related expenses. The reality of the
situation, however, is that the tax money is, by and large, in
the suburbs and the poverty expenses are, by and large, in the
city.' To counteract fiscal inequality and to match regional
revenue with regional expenditures, a model must link the sub-
urban tax base with the city budget."12 The constraints on this
model are both constitutional"' and political." 4 If the correct
legal mechanism is developed to redistribute the impact of
poverty-related expenses across a region, however, the political
barriers can be overcome.
Several possible methods exist to regionally redistribute pov-
erty-related expenses. Municipalities might use direct taxes, link-
age taxes, annexation, or a regional government to spread the
burden of poverty. Alternatively, municipalities can look to
106. Wooster, supra note 73, at 53.
107. See Gurwitt, supra note 101, at 60.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 59.
111. See supra notes 22-25, 62 and accompanying text.
112. Even Tiebout acknowledges that pure localism is inefficient and re-
gionalism is necessary when external economies and diseconomies are of
sufficient importance. Specifically, Tiebout notes that "[n]ot all aspects of
law enforcement are adequately handled at the local level. The function of
the sheriff, state police, and the FBI - as contrasted with the local police -
may be cited as resulting from a need for integration." Tiebout, Pure Theory,
supra note 26, at 423.
113. See infra part V.A.
114. See infra part V.C.
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either the state or federal government to effect regional redis-
tribution. Most of these models, however, present serious prac-
tical or political problems. On comparison, only a model built
on state intervention can successfully redistribute poverty-related
expenses.
A. Direct Tax
The first option for regional redistribution is direct taxation
of suburban residents by the city. According to an economic
model developed by Charles Tiebout, taxation of benefits solves
the spillover problems caused by exclusionary zoning." 5 To tax
suburban residents, however, cities must establish a taxing nexus
sufficient to pass constitutional muster. The "simple, but con-
trolling, question is whether the [city] has given anything for
which it can ask return.""' 6 If nothing is- given in return, any
taxation of an individual violates the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution, which requires that the government
shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.... 1117
Thus, in order for such a direct tax to pass constitutional
muster, a direct nexus between the tax and the benefit must
exist. One might argue that the proposed tax is justified because
suburbanites receive the benefit of less homelessness and less
crime because crime and homelessness are problems concentrated
in the city." 8 However, no court has yet found such a benefit.
115. Charles M. Tiebout, An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization,
in PUBLIC FINANCES: NEEDS, SOURCES AND UTILIZATION 79, 94 (National Bureau
of Economic Research ed., 1961). For example, if town A sprays all of its
trees to get rid of pests and the spray extends beyond Town A's borders then
all the surrounding towns that benefitted from A's spraying must pay a
benefits tax. Id. at 94-95.
Thus, extending this theory to the problem at hand: If the city has a
disproportionate share of the region's poor and pays for all the services
associated with the poor, then the surrounding towns that benefit from the
city providing services to the poor, must pay a benefits tax.
116. See Wisconsin v. I.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (requiring
a state to provide protection, opportunities, and benefits before it may tax an
activity); see also Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. Ct.
2268, 2276 (1994) (stating that a state can exact a return if it affords taxpayer
protection opportunities and benefits); Allied Signal Inc. v. Director, 112 S.
Ct. 2251, 2258 (1992) (holding that the power to tax is based on protection,
opportunities, and benefits conferred).
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. See DAviD T. HERBERT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN CRimE 102 (1982)
(identifying large cities and densely populated areas as main problem areas of
crime); Drew P. Gannon, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Legislative Programs
for Financially Distressed Municipalities and the Reaction of Municipal Labor
Unions, 98 DICK. L. REv. 281, 289 (1994) ("Social problems such as crime,
drugs, homelessness and AIDS [are especially concentrated in large cities].").
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Although some politicians have suggested a formal method of
regional taxation to recognize the city's role in providing health
care and social services, no legislature has yet adopted such a
plan. 
9
B. Linkage Tax
An alternative to a direct tax would be to assess a linkage
tax (or user fee) on those suburban residents who have direct
dealings with the city. For example, a city might tax those who
work in the city, attend cultural events in the city, or use
airports located in the city. 20 A city wage tax on non-resident
workers is the clearest example of a linkage tax.
However, linkage taxes only work if the resulting price, in-
cluding tax, of city products is less than comparable goods
suburbanites can purchase outside of the city.'2' Thus, as long
as the suburban worker makes more money in the city, despite
the wage tax, he will continue to commute to the city for
employment. However, if there is no parity in the tax rates
between the suburbs and the city, employers in the city will
have to pay higher wages to offset the increased tax burden.
The result is that city employers will be at an economic disad-
vantage. Due to increasing employment opportunities, workers
now have a choice as to employment location.'2 Thus, the
imposition of a wage tax on nonresidents will accelerate em-
ployment shifts to the suburbs. 2 3 In other words, the imposition
See generally U.S. CoNF. oF MAYORS, A STATUS RPT. ON HUNGER & HOME-
LESSNESS iN AMERICA'S CrriEs: 1991, 59-60 (1991); Homeless Problem Wors-
ening, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 1991, at A2.
119. See George Judson, New Haven's Task: Tying City to Region to
Promote Growth, N.Y. Tn Es, June 1, 1993, at Al (describing a plan to share
tax revenues from development regionally).
120. See Larry Rohter, Meal Tax to Aid Miami's Homeless, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 3, 1993, at A10 (noting that Dade County, Florida approved a 1% tax
on restaurant meals in Miami restaurants in order to underwrite medical
treatment and job training programs for the homeless and to build low cost
housing and temporary shelters).
121. See H. Craig Lewis, The Suburbs Have Grown Up and the City Needs
to Adjust, PHiLA. INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 1992, at A9. As a result of its recent
fiscal crisis, Philadelphia obtained state authorization to impose an additional
1% sales tax on goods bought within the city. The result was an across-the-
board increase in the cost of goods bought in the city which placed city
businesses at a comparative economic disadvantage with their suburban com-
petitors. As H. Craig Lewis, a state legislator from suburban Bucks County,
noted, "[tihe fiscal crisis is a unique opportunity to promote revenue-generating
mechanisms that work for the whole region. A local sales tax could be part
of that but only if it is in place in surrounding counties too." Id.
122. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
123. See Inman, supra note 94 at 11.
[Vol. 47:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/2
REDISTRIBUTING URBAN POVERTY
of a user tax will not solve the problem, as long as suburbanites
have the opportunity to purchase goods, without the tax, outside
the city.'1
C. Annexation
Instead of taxing suburban residents, cities might attempt to
use the process of annexation to bring the suburbs under the
city's taxing umbrella. Cities that have annexed suburbs, such
as Austin, Charlotte, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis, have much
lower poverty and crime rates than those cities unable to annex
suburbs. 25 To annex a suburb, however, requires an affirmative
vote of both city and suburban residents. 26 Few municipalities
can achieve such a vote. Even those cities previously successful
with annexation, find it difficult to annex today. 127 For example,
from 1940 to 1980, Memphis captured 54 percent of its metro-
politan area's population growth by annexing suburbs. 128 By
1980, however, annexation became a difficult and very litigious
process, and virtually stopped. 29
Annexation is almost impossible in today's political climate.
Suburban residents are increasingly reluctant to trust the political
124. Linkage taxes or user fees succeed when there is a clearly defined and
regionally unique function that the city is performing for the benefit of the
suburbs. Charles Andes, The Suburbs Ought to Chip In, PHMA. INQUIRER,
Sept. 15, 1992, at Cl (noting that in Denver and St. Louis, cultural institutions
tend to be concentrated in the city, and in those metropolitan areas, suburban
residents support regional cultural institutions with a regional tax for the arts).
See also Engelhardt and O'Meia, supra note 100, at IA (pointing out that
cities which sell their water to the suburbs provide such a unique service that
the suburbs have little choice but to accept increased taxes as when the City
of West Palm Beach proposed a surcharge.n water it provides to neighboring
Palm Beach).
125. See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1378; Boldt, supra note 97, at C7.
One commentator notes that the great flaw of urban policy in the 1950s
and 1960s was that it dealt with cities as cities and not as centers of
metropolitan areas. Judson, supra note 119, at BI. According to Judson, the
goal of urban policy should be to reconnect older cities to their suburbs so
that they can compete with newer cities that grew up annexing their suburbs.
Id.
126. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 60 para. 1/15-15(e) (Smith-Hurd 1992
& Supp. 1994) ("If a majority of those voting on the proposition do not vote
in favor of it, the territory shall remain with the adjacent township [that is
coterminous with the city].").
127. Dreier, supra note 2, at 1360 ("Only a few cities are in a position to
annex outlying areas. Efforts to forge metropolitan-wide government, .
have met with strong resistance, particularly by suburbanites.").
128. Smothers, supra note 56, at AI0.
129. Id.
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system from which they have fled. 30 Moreover, urban minority
leaders resist annexation 3' for fear that annexation of predom-
inately white suburbs will dilute and threaten their new-found
political powers. 13 2
D. Creation of Regional Government
At first glance, creation of a broad regional government is
an attractive alternative to taxation or annexation. Most notably,
it surmounts the constitutional problem inherent in taxation
because voters would create a regional government at the ballot
box. The regional government solution, however presents the
same political drawbacks found in annexation. 3 3 Many groups,
especially suburbanites, have resisted efforts to create regional
governments. 3 4 Thus, once more, "the political reality of estab-
lished government structures, as well as suburban whites jeal-
ously guarding their racially and economically homogeneous
enclaves, and urban blacks benefitting from a rising tide of
political power,"' 35 will dash any hopes of creating a broad
based regional government.
Metropolitan based government and tax assessment programs
have been politically successful when the entity directly benefits
both city and suburban residents. Examples include special serv-
ice districts and mass transit systems. 136 Thus, even if, in an
130. See Judson, supra note 119, at Al (noting that in New Haven,
Connecticut, "reconnecting the city with its suburbs is a delicate task. Decades
of suspicion have built up, racial divisions are deep, and many people who
no longer live, work or shop in New Haven now fear the inner city.").
131. An exception is Memphis Mayor W. W. Herenton, an African-Amer-
ican, who proposed that Memphis should merge with the suburbs of surround-
ing Shelby County. The consolidation idea grew from the need to prop up
the city tax base. Memphis business leaders immediately backed the suggestion,
maintaining that a merger would lessen the city's tax burden. Smothers, supra
note 56, at A10.
132. See Judson, supra note 119, at B1.
133. See supra part IV.B (discussing political and social resistance to efforts
to regionalize).
134. Dreier, supra note 2, at 1360.
135. Smothers, supra note 56, at A10.
136. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTn. CODE §§ 28500-29757 (1973 & Supp. 1994)
(creating the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District); CAL. PuB. UTI.
CODE § 29690 (1973) (providing for the levy and collection of taxes by the
special service district); 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1501-1543 (1993) (creating
the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority which serves the
Philadelphia region).
in Anema v. Transit Construction Authority, 788 P.2d 1261 (Colo. Sup.
Ct. 1990), the Colorado Court of Appeals discussed the constitutional necessity
of a clearly enunciated benefit. The court upheld a tax on suburban residents
for a transit system because "[the] assessment constituted a valid special fee
imposed on those individuals and entities reasonably likely to benefit from a
[Vol. 47:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/2
REDISTRIBUTING URBAN POVERTY
effort to persuade surburban residents to accept a regional
government, one were to conclusively prove that suburban re-
sidents benefit from the city bearing the problems of poverty,
such a benefit is most likely too small to withstand political
resistance.
E. Federal Government Intervention
Some commentators propose that the federal government
should intervene and redistribute revenues between cities and
their suburbs. 3 7 Redistribution at the federal level, however,
does not take into consideration the differing economic and
political needs that face each individual metropolitan region. A
redistribution formula that works for the Philadelphia Region
(where the city and county are coterminus and the suburban
counties ring the city), may not work for the Miami Region
(where the metropolitan area bleeds imperceptibly into the West
Palm Beach Metropolitan Area). Furthermore, even proponents
of federal intervention concede that creating a national redistri-
bution model is bureaucratically daunting. 38 The resulting, nec-
essarily complex, agency would only further bloat the federal
government.13 9
F. State Government Intervention
The method of revenue redistribution with the surest legal
footing, and the most plausible political support, exists at the
state government level.1' ° Policy analysts traditionally emphasize
rapid transit system." Id. at 1267.
Research shows that regional agencies increasingly focus on the areas of
transportation and environmental protection. Regional councils, however, tend
not to respond to human services needs. Robert Gage, Regional Council
Program Priorities for the 1990s: Two Emerging Program Clusters, 11 POL'Y
STUD. Rav. 57, 72 (1992).
137. Ledebur & Barnes, supra note 18, at 11-12; Galowitz, supra note 42,
at 82.
Edward Rendell, Mayor of Philadelphia, calls for a "New Urban Agenda"
for the federal government which would "tip the playing field" in favor of
cities and permit cities to compete economically with the suburbs. He proposes
to create federal incentives for regional cooperation, including: mandatory
purchasing requirements for the federal government from city vendors; place-
ment of federal facilities in distressed urban areas; federal funding mandates;
reviving tax incentives to spur city development; lifting restrictions on com-
munity-based housing develgpment; and redevelopment of urban "brown
fields" (hazardous waste sites). Rendell, supra note 76, at A23.
138. Galowitz, supra note 42, at 101-02.
139. Id.
140. Some commentators feel that because the spill-over effects of local
exclusionary zoning are regional rather that statewide in scope, the redistri-
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the ability of a higher-level government, whose boundaries en-
compass both the spillover's source and the geographic area the
spillover affects, to internalize interjurisdictional cost spillov-
ers.14 1 State regulation "transcends local prejudice and parochi-
alism" and insulates local officials from their constituents who
favor exclusionary zoning. 42
Using the power of the state government eliminates many of
the hurdles associated with revenue redistribution. 43 First, unlike
a direct tax, redistribution by the state does not violate the due
process clause because the state government represents all of the
groups affected by the redistribution.' 44 Second, handling the
problem on a state level avoids some of the bureaucratic prob-
lems associated with federal intervention.145 Most importantly,
though, by using state government, the power of the state courts
can be brought to bear on legislators who may resist regionalism
out of self-interest. 46 The result of state mandated regionalism
would be that citizens of certain municipalities would pay a tax
to a higher level of government, for the privilege of excluding
the poor by engaging in exclusionary zoning. 147
bution should occur on the metro-regional level, rather than the state level.
See Galowitz, supra note 42, at 108-40 (discussing interstate reaction "to
metro-regional exclusionary zoning at the sub-federal level."). While this
argument addresses the legal problems inherent in redistribution programs, it
ignores the political reality of intraregional resistance.
141. Robert Ellickson, Public Property Rights: A Government's Rights and
Duties When Its Landowners Come Into Conflict With Outsiders, 52 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1627, 1628, 1657 (1979).
142. Galowitz, supra note 42, at 91, 96-97.
143. Metropolitan areas that cross state borders face a jurisdictional prob-
lem. The most notable examples are New York (New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut), Chicago (Illinois, Wisconsin, and Indiana) and Philadelphia
(Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware). Of the 75 most populous metro-
politan areas, 14 cross state boundaries. These 14 account for 33% of the
population of the 75 areas (with New York alone accounting for 11%). U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BooK 1991,
Table 3 (1991).
Thus, in these multistate metropolitan regions, there must also be interstate
compacts that support state sponsored efforts of regional distribution. This
support can take the form of comity of legal decisions reached in neighboring
courts and participation in multistate arbitration of fair share agreements.
There is adequate legal precedent for such interstate compacts. See, e.g., 36
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503 (1961 & Supp. 1994) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §
32:3-2 (West 1990) (creating the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Port Authority).
144. See supra part V.A (describing direct taxes).
145. See supra part V.E (describing federal intervention).
146. See supra part IV.B (explaining why politicians resist regionalism).
147. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements, supra note 49, at 693.
For an insightful and interesting discussion of casting this compensation as a
liability rule rather than a property rule and of internalizing externalities
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1. Zoning Power is Given to Municipalities by States
Land use regulation is traditionally a local government activ-
ity, nrot a state government activity. 148 Both the law and land
use planning theory, however, recognize a significant state role
in zoning.
From the legal perspective, states create local municipalities
through incorporation. States have constitutional authority over
municipalities. 49 Accordingly, municipal police power flows from
the authority of the state legislature. 50 States may also freely
modify this municipal power for the good of all of the state's
citizens.' 5
Most state constitutions require that municipalities exercise
the police power for the general welfare of the people. 52 In
through "pigovian taxes," see id. at 692-93. A pigovian tax is a tax paid to
engage in exclusionary zoning. Id.
148. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure
of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990).
149. Furthermore, the validity of a municipality's attempt to act outside of
the scope of power specifically granted to it by the state is limited by Dillon's
Rule. Dillon's Rule states that local governments have only those powers
specifically granted by constitution or statute or necessarily arising by impli-
cation from the power expressly granted by the state. 1 JoHN F. DILLON,
Co NTRE ms ON THE LAW Or MUNIcnPA CORPORATIONs 448 (5th ed. 1911).
See, e.g., In re Petition of Ball Mountain Dam Hydroelectric Project, 576
A.2d 124, 126 (Vt. 1990) ("We have consistently adhered to the so-called
Dillon's rule . . . ."); White v. Union County, 377 S.E.2d 93, 95 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989) (Dillon's Rule is well settled in North Carolina); Hylton Ent., Inc.
v. Board of Supervisors, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Va. 1979) ("Adaerence to
[Dillon's Rule] has not been merely perfunctory, but has been conclusively
evidenced by the affirmative action of the General Assembly. . . ."); O'Fallon
Development Co., Inc. v. City of O'Fallon, 356 N.E.2d 1293, 1298 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1976) ("Dillon's Rule ... continues to apply to nonhome rule units of
local government.").
150. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 726 (1975) ("The zoning power is a police power and
the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted
in the same manner as is the state."); McDougall, Regional Contribution
Agreements, supra note 49, at 670, n.42.
151. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926)
(holding that municipal zoning codes are a valid exercise of the police power,
but "where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of
the municipality the municipality [is] not allowed to stand in the way.").
152. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the consti-
tutionality of zoning ordinances). See, e.g., Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 415, 417 (N.J. 1983)
[Mount Laurel Ill (interpreting NJ CoNsT. Art. 1, §1 (1947)); Meitner v.
Township of Cheltenham, 460 A.2d 1235, 1238 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1983)
(interpreting PA CoNsT. Art. 1, §1 (1873)). Lees v. Bay Area Air Pollution
Control Dist., 238 Cal. App. 2d 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965) (interpreting CA
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particular, police power laws must be for the general welfare of
the citizens of the entire state, not solely for the general welfare
of the citizens of that particular municipality.153
From the planning perspective, planners recognize that the
state has a legitimate role in land use regulation in four situa-
tions: 1) when "problems spill across jurisdictional bounda-
ries; 1 54 2) when "local interests diverge from the interests of a
broader public;" 155 3) when "problems arise on lands not subject
to effective local control;' '156 or 4) "when problems arise in
implementing state policies of carrying out state investments.' 51 7
The concentration of urban poverty caused by suburban exclu-
sionary zoning clearly meets three of these criteria. Suburban
exclusionary zoning creates spill-overs, represents suburban in-
terest that diverge from regional interests, and cannot be ade-
quately combatted due to jurisdictional problems. Land use
planning policy, therefore, suggests that the state has a right to
intervene.
2. Model for Regional Redistribution of Poverty-Related
Expenses
Before each state develops a regional redistribution model, it
must first determine the regional per capita poverty-related
expenditure benchmark.15 To calculate the benchmark, the state
first is divided into urban-center regions. 59 Second, each mu-
nicipality within each region submits its total spending for
poverty-related services to the state agency. Third, the per capita
poverty spending rate is calculated for each region.' 60 This figure
represents the per capita "fair share" of poverty spending each
municipality should bear. Finally, each municipality's per capita
CONST. Art. 1, §14 (1879) and noting that the police power protects the order,
safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society); State Bd. of Barber
Examiners v. Cloud, 44 N.E.2d 972, 980 (Ind. 1942) (interpreting IND. CONST.
Art. 1, §1 (1875)); Illinois ex rel. Mosier v. City of Springfield, 19 N.E.2d
598 (III. 1939) (interpreting ILL. CONST. Art. 4, §22 (1870)); Bosworth v. City
of Lexington, 125 S.W.2d 995, 1000 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939) (interpreting Ky
CONST. §1); Mo CONST. Art. 1, §2 (1875).
153. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 726; Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415.
154. Galowitz, supra note 42, at 84.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. In the case of multistate metropolitan areas, the model would be
implemented by each state in the region. Each state would determine which
poverty related expenses are to be included.
159. Thus, rural areas would not participate in this redistribution.
160. To calculate per capita spending, divide the dollar amount spent by
the region on poverty related services by the total regional population.
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poverty-spending rate is calculated. If a municipality's per capita
poverty-spending rate is below the regional per capita poverty-
spending benchmark, it will be deemed to be receiving the benefit
of exclusionary zoning. If, however, a municipality's per capita
poverty-spending rate exceeds the regional benchmark, it will be
deemed to be bearing the burden of exclusionary zoning.
If a municipality's per capita poverty-spending rate is below
the regional benchmark, that municipality will pay an amount
equal to the deficiency to a state agency. The state agency will
then proportionately redistribute this money to those munici-
palities whose poverty-spending rate exceeds the regional bench-
mark.
For example, assume a city with a population of 100 is
surrounded by one suburb with 100 people (see Chart 4). Each
municipality has a budget of $1,000. Because cities spend pro-
portionately more of their budget on poverty-related services,' 6
assume that the city spends $200 on poverty-related services and
the suburb spends $20. This means that the city spends $2 per
capita on poverty-related services and the suburb spends $0.20.
Added together, this region of 200 people spends a total of
$220 on poverty-related services. Therefore, the regional poverty-
spending per capita is $1.10. This is the regional benchmark.
Because the suburb's per capita poverty expenditures are below
the regional benchmark, the suburb. would pay the difference
between its per capita poverty-spending rate and the regional
benchmark. Thus, the suburb would pay the state agency $0.90
per capita, or a total of $90. The city would receive this money
to the extent that its per capita poverty spending exceeds $1.10.
In this case, the city's per capita poverty spending exceeds the
regional benchmark by $0.90 per capita, or a total of $90. Thus,
after redistribution, each municipality would spend $1.10 per
capita on poverty-related services.
City Suburb Region
Population 100 100 200
Total Budget $1,000 $1,000 $2,000
Poverty-Related $200 $20 $220
Expenditures
Per Capita Poverty-
Related Expenditures $2 $0.20 $1.10
Chart 4
161. See supra part III.
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Under this model, communities still retain the power or "play
or pay." They have a choice: they can allow poor people into
their jurisdiction by allowing low income housing to be built,
thus increasing their per capita poverty-spending, or they can
pay the state to redistribute revenue to areas carrying more than
their fair share of the poverty-related expenditure burden. This
regional expenditure sharing is not regionalized service delivery,
or a call for metropolitan government. Rather, it offers a plan
for cities and suburbs to work together for the benefit of all
the citizens of the region, while maintaining separate political
divisions.
3. The Impact of Judicial Intervention
Suburban residents would likely resist state redistribution leg-
islation with the same fervor associated with direct taxation and
annexation. 62 Regardless, the state courts have the power to
judicially fabricate such a model while waiting for legislative
action. Professor McDougall noted, "[T]he judiciary [is] often
the most responsive of the three branches to public pressure to
intervene .... In the absence of administrative and regulatory
bodies established and equipped to handle exclusionary zoning
problems, courts [find] themselves thrust into roles requiring
administrative, legislative and judicial techniques in equal meas-
ure." 163
Judicial activism is crucial for the implementation of a policy
to regionally share poverty-related expenditures. State politicians
from suburban districts, while possibly personally favoring re-
gional redistribution, 64 are at the mercy of their electorates,
who will oppose any redistribution efforts which have them on
the tax-paying end. 165 Courts must intervene to keep politicians
insulated from retaliatory acts of their constituencies.
This is not to maintain that the courts should handle redis-
tribution on a permanent basis. They should not, however, stand
silent while politicians protect their political careers.' 66 In the
absence of meaningful advancement of regional redistribution
by the legislature or executive branch, the court's involvement
162. See supra parts V.A, .C.
163. Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary
Zoning Law, 22 HAIv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 623, 650-51 (1987) [hereinafter
McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation].
164. See Lewis, supra note 121, at A9 (advocating a more regional outlook).
165. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing suburban
resentment of redistribution).
166. See McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation, supra note 163, at
624-25 (noting that politicians avoid addressing the problem of exclusionary
zoning for fear of negative reactions from municipal officials and voters),
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in propelling redistribution efforts is crucial. Without constitu-
tional pressure maintained by the courts, the general regional
welfare will not be served. 167 Courts must follow the lead of the
New Jersey Supreme Court and demonstrate that without leg-
islation the courts will solve the problem, leaving only the
question of how for the legislators. 16s
4. Learning From Mount Laurel
a. The Basis of the Mount Laurel Doctrine
The legal formulation for the proposed fair share imposition
model is well developed in New Jersey's Mount Laurel deci-
sions.6 9 In these decisions, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
used the state constitution's general welfare clause to establish
a system for regional distribution of housing costs.170 The Mount
Laurel Doctrine has proved complicated to implement, but it is
based on a simple principle: Each municipality must provide for
both its own housing needs and its "fair share" of the region's
housing demands. 171
The Mount Laurel Doctrine was limited to the provision of
low and moderate income housing. 172 The same theory and legal
configurations, however, also apply to wider regional prob-
167. See Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 42-43 (noting that
without judicial pressure in the Mount Laurel decisions, the New Jersey
legislature would not have enacted the Fair Housing Act).
168. See Peter Buchsbaum, Mount Laurel II, A Ten-Year Retrospective,
ST. & Loc. L. Nnws, Winter 1994, at 7, 17 (noting that without judicial
pressure in Mount Laurel, the New Jersey legislature would not have enacted
the Fair Housing Act).
John M. Payne, From the Courts: Mount Laurel Goes National, 15 REAL
EsT. L.J. 62, 70 (1986) [hereinafter Payne, Mount Laurel Goes National](stating that Mount Laurel demonstrates to "legislatures that without legisla-
tion, the courts will solve the problems [thus] leaving to the legislature only
the choice of how it will be solved .... [The result] cannot be achieved
without judicial resolve to stay the course.").
169. Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986)
(Mount Laurel III); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel I1); Southern Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) (Mount Laurel 1).
170. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415 ("[T]hose regulations that do
not provide the requisite opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for
low and moderate income housing conflict with the general welfare and violate
the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection.").
171. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 21.
172. See Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 731-32.
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lems. 17 The Mount Laurel Doctrine attacks exclusionary zoning
practices that shift the burden of low and moderate income
housing out of certain communities. 74 The same attack may be
made in situations where exclusionary zoning causes regional
disparity in the incidence of poverty and poverty-related expen-
ditures. Investigating the evolution of the most celebrated re-
gionalism doctrine, therefore, proves instructive when developing
a model for regional cooperation in poverty-related expense
redistribution. 75
b. Mount Laurel I
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel76 (Mount Laurel 1) began the long line of legal battles
through which the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the
necessity of regional (as opposed to purely local) planning. The
New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a developing
municipality could use land use regulations to "make it physi-
cally and economically impossible to provide low and moderate
income housing in the municipality for the various categories of
persons who need and want it," thus excluding them from living
in the municipality because they could not afford existing hous-
ing. 177
Justice Pashman, in an impassioned concurrence in Mount
Laurel I, noted that municipalities use their zoning power to
"take advantage of regional development without having to bear
the burdens of such development"'7 8 and to "maintain them-
173. The Mount Laurel decisions have met with limited success outside of
New Jersey. See infra notes 229-39 and accompanying text. However, this
reluctance of other states to wholeheartedly embrace the Mount Laurel deci-
sions should not overshadow the decisions' enormous contribution to the
efforts of regional planning. Instead of seeing the limited application outside
of New Jersey as a defeat we should view it as instructive. Other states'
reluctance to jump into the fray midstream may now be abated as the doctrine
has been played out in full in New Jersey and the pitfalls discovered and
repaired.
174. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415.
175. This Article does not engage in an exhaustive examination of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine see Mc-
Dougall, Regional Contribution Agreements, supra note 49.
176. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1974).
177. Id. at 724. The Township of Mount Laurel, a Philadelphia suburb,
enacted zoning ordinances that permitted only detached, single-family homes
in residential areas. Id. at 719. The ordinance "realistically allow[ed] only
homes within the financial reach of persons of at least middle income." Id.
In the face of a housing shortage, the NAACP sued the township on behalf
of various groups of minorities including people who lived in "central city
substandard housing in the region." Id. at 717.
178. Id. at 736.
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selves as enclaves of affluence or of social homogeneity."'1 79 The
court unanimously held that municipalities could not use their
zoning power to exclude low and moderate income persons.'80
In Mount Laurel I, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined
that exclusionary zoning violated the general welfare clause of
the New Jersey State Constitution." The court noted that
"general welfare" reached beyond the welfare of the citizens of
any given municipality to the welfare of all state residents. 82
The Mount Laurel I court recognized, however, that the power
to raise local revenue is determined on an individual municipal
basis, rather than a regionally determined one.' While some of
a region's municipalities might be better suited to bear more of
the region's low and moderate income housing, the state's tax
structure required each municipality to bear it's "fair share" of
the region's housing needs.'" Absent an agreement between all
of the region's municipalities, the court concluded that only
proportional allocation of the housing burden could achieve the
desired result. 85
Mount Laurel I was a monumental decision. It recognized
that the zoning codes of individual municipalities could - and
should - be scrutinized, not only for their effect on the citizens
of that particular municipality, but also for their effect on
persons living outside the municipality's political and geographic
boundaries. Compliance with Mount Laurel I, however, was
slow and spotty.' " The New Jersey Supreme Court lacked the
legislative ability to enforce its decision. The Mount Laurel I
decision dealt only with principles, not implementation, leaving
open the question of remedies. 87 In fact, many felt that the
179. Id.
180. Id. at 731.
181. 336 A.2d at 730. The New Jersey zoning enabling act in effect at that
time contained a general welfare clause. See, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§40:55-30 to
55-51 (1968), amended by N.J. STAT. ANN. §40:55D (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§40:55-32 (1968), amended by N.J. STAT. ANN. §40:55D-2.a (West 1991).
182. 336 A.2d at 726 ("When regulation does have a substantial external
impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the border of the particular
municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.").
183. Id. at 732.
184. Id. at 732-33.
185. Id.
186. John R. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey's Mount Laurel
Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 PACE E vTL. L. REv. 3, 16
(1986) (emphasizing that the Mount Laurel II decision resulted from New
Jersey judiciary's great frustration with the lack of local compliance with the
Mount Laurel I decision).
187. See Buchsbaum, supra note 168, at 7 ("Most important[ly], Mount
Laurel I ... left open the question of remedy.").
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Mount Laurel I decision could be ignored as ineffective. 8 '
c. Mount Laurel 11
The New Jersey Supreme Court revisited the issue of exclu-
sionary zoning in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laure1 9 (Mount Laurel II). In Mount Laurel
II, the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly held that zoning
ordinances must further the general welfare of all the citizens
including those outside the municipality, if they live within the
region that contributes to the municipality's housing demand. 19
Accordingly, a zoning ordinance that fails to "provide the
requisite opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for
low and moderate income housing," contravenes the general
welfare, and thus, violates the state constitution. 191
The Mount Laurel I court recognized that suburban exclu-
sionary zoning practices are a major cause of urban deteriora-
tion.1 92 These exclusionary practices increase the relative
concentration of poor in the cities and thereby hasten the flight
of business and the middle class to the suburbs. 93 Providing
lower income housing in the suburbs may help to relieve cities
of the "overwhelming fiscal and social burden" that exclusion-
ary zoning practices cause. 94
188. See Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 22 (contending
that while Mount Laurel I was ineffective, Mount Laurel II "worked and
stirred up a firestorm.").
189. 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983). Mount Laurel 11 consolidated six cases in
which the parties sought clarification of the Mount Laurel I doctrine. Id. at
410-11. In one of the cases, the NAACP challenged a trial court's decision
that the Township of Mount Laurel had complied with Mount Laurel L The
trial court had found the Township in compliance with Mount Laurel I because
it had made "a bona fide attempt ... to provide a realistic opportunity for
the construction of its fair share of the regional lower income housing need."
Id. at 411.
190. Id. at 415. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
When the exercise of [exclusionary zoning] power by a municipality
affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare
includes more than the welfare of that municipality and its citizens:
it also includes the general welfare ... of those residing outside
of the municipality, but within the region that contributes to the
housing demand within the municipality.
Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 415-16, n.5.
193. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that while cities bear much of the
burden of exclusionary zoning, deteriorating cities threaten the whole state.
In addition to imposing costs on all the state's taxpayers, "[t]he continuing
disintegration of our cities encourages business and industry to leave New
Jersey altogether . . . ." Id.
194. 456 A.2d at 415-16 n.5.
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The Mount Laurel II court found that in order to comply
with Mount Laurel I, a municipality must provide a realistic
opportunity for the construction of its regional fair share of
low and moderate income housing.1 95 The court recommended
that government should use affirmative devices to make such
realistic construction opportunities. These devices include lower-
income density bonuses, mandatory set asides, and cooperation
in achieving federal subsidies1 96
To apply its rule, the court defined "region" as "the general
area which constitutes the housing market area of which the
subject municipality is a part and from which the prospective
population of the municipality would substantially be drawn, in
the absence of exclusionary zoning."' 197 Importantly the Mount
Laurel 11 decision abandoned the previous limitation of the
Mount Laurel Doctrine to "developing" communities (i.e., com-
munities that were building new housing). 19 Instead, in Mount
Laurel II, the court imposed fair share quotas on each com-
munity in the state, with special emphasis on so-called growth
areas. 99 Additionally, the court concluded that a community
could not calculate its regional fair share based on its own
projected population. Rather, the court required communities
to use the projected population of the region. 200
A major problem of Mount Laurel I, however, was lack of
a concrete methodology to determine a municipality's "fair
share." The court declined to enunciate specific numbers to
determine "regional need," calling instead for expert witness
determination. 2°0 The court's indecision triggered a debate that
continued for many years. Subsequent battles over implementing
Mount Laurel I revealed a serious problem: one method for
calculating regional housing need generated implausible numbers
while the other generated numbers too high to be politically
acceptable .202
195. Id. at 419.
196. Id. at 419, 448.
197. Id. at 440 (quoting Oakland v. Madison, 371 A.2d 1192 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law. Div. 1974)).
198. Id. at 430.
199. 456 A.2d at 430-31. The court noted, however, that zoning decisions
must reflect regional considerations and that every municipality should not be
"a microcosm of the entire state in it's housing pattern .... ." Id.
200. Id. at 441.
201. See id. at 440 ("We will not attempt here to provide any further
guidance for the determination of regional need, but leave to the experts,
including the experts appointed by trial court pursuant to our opinion.").
202. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 24-26. Payne describes
the two approaches as one for calculating "prospective need" and one for
calculating "financial need." Id. at 25. Because of the complex and speculative
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Finally, the Mount Laurel II court struggled with institutional
barriers to developing an effective legal remedy. The absence of
legislative assistance forced the court to sit as a super-legislature
and enact judicial guidelines, in lieu of administrative regula-
tions. 2°3 Mount Laurel H produced a hailstorm of criticism from
municipalities that faced judicially enacted mandatory zoning
regulations. 2 4 The Governor of New Jersey called the judiciary's
guidelines "communistic." 205
d. The Fair Housing Act
Since 1975, the court had been calling for action from the
legislature. 206 In 1985, ten years after Mount Laurel I and two
years after Mount Laurel II, the New Jersey legislature finally
took up the mantle of regionally determined need for low and
moderate income housing by enacting the Fair Housing Act.0 7
The Fair Housing Act created an administrative agency known
as the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH). 28 By creating
this state-wide agency, the legislature acknowledged a legitimate
state interest in the effects of zoning - an area that had
historically been solely within the purview of local authoritiesY°9
By creating COAH the legislature solved the legitimacy problem
of judicially enacted legislation. 210
Under New Jersey's Fair Housing Act, COAH has the power
to: 1) define housing regions in the state and assess regional
low and moderate income housing need, 2) promulgate criteria
and guidelines to enable municipalities within the region to
determine fair share of regional housing need, and 3) decide
(upon application from a municipality) whether proposed ordi-
approach of "prospective need," Payne opined, its results made the process
"inherently implausible." Id. The "financial need" approach, based on the
number of households paying 25% to 30% of their income fair housing,
generated numbers "that would have been politically devastating." Id.
203. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 458-59.
204. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 22 (noting that the
New Jersey Supreme Court "strayed so far into political territory that they
could prevail only by obeying political rules, which, by definition, courts
cannot obey.").
205. Id. at 22; Buchsbaum, supra note 165, at 8 ("Conservative suburban
legislators sharply criticized what they termed to be 'judicial imperialism that
threatened to destroy the fabric of their communities."'). One local mayor
said he would go to jail before he would obey a Mount Laurel judgement.
Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 22.
206. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417.
207. N.J. STAT. AxN. §52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
208. N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:27D-305 (West 1986).
209. See supra part V.F.1 (describing traditional zoning practices).
210. See Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 29.
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nances and related measures will satisfy their Mount Laurel
obligation. 211
Not only does the Fair Housing Act provide a statutory
method for each municipality to determine and provide for its
fair share of regional need for low and moderate income hous-
ing,212 it also implements a mechanism through which a munic-
ipality can "buy out" its obligation. 21 3 Municipalities can share
Mount Laurel obligations by entering into what is known as a
Regional Contribution Agreement (RCA). By paying the cost of
building lower income housing, one municipality can transfer to
another, if the other agrees, up to fifty percent of its obliga-
tion. 214 This provision allows suburban municipalities to transfer
a portion of their obligation to urban areas within the same
region.
This unique and innovative form of urban-suburban revenue
sharing arose as a result of the pressure of fulfilling Mount
Laurel fair share requirements. 215 Although RCAs have critics,216
RCAs address the political reality that some communities would
rather "pay" by exporting revenue than "play" by accepting
low and moderate income housing into their community. 21 7
RCAs and their successful implementation provide an ideal
model for formulating a method of regional redistribution of
poverty-related expenses. 21s
211. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-307 (West Supp. 1994)
212. N.J. STAT. AN. §§ 52:27D-307 to -311 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
213. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-312 (1986 & Supp. 1994).
214. Id. The statute provides that "[a] municipality may propose the transfer
of up to 50%70 of its fair share to another municipality within its housing
region by means of a contractual agreement into which two municipalities
voluntarily enter." Id.
215. Buchsbaum, supra note 168, at 17.
216. See McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements, supra note 49, at
682-83 (questioning whether low income housing will be more efficiently
developed under RCAs). Professor McDougall notes that due to the cities'
precarious financial positiorr they may be more inclined to accept an econom-
ically disadvantageous RCA. When the money provided by the RCA is
insufficient to house the additional low income burden then cities are worse
off than before the agreement. Id.
217. At least one commentator believes that the most effective way to
provide for the poor "is for both the city and the suburbs to agree to accept
their fair share of indigent people." Galowitz, supra note 42, at 80. This,
however, is politically unrealistic. Solutions to regional disparity such as this,
while legally sound, ignore political reality that would bar their implementation.
It is important to note, however, that a municipality cannot transfer all of
its fair share obligation through RCAs. By limiting transfer to 50%, the
legislature required that "the provision of housing in urban areas must be
balanced with the need to provide housing throughout the State for the free
mobility of citizens." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302g (West 1986).
218. Douglas V. Opaski, executive director of COAH, states that RCAs
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e. Mount Laurel III and Beyond
The New Jersey Supreme Court validated the Fair Housing
Act and COAH in Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Town-
ship,21 9 (Mount Laurel I1). In Mount Laurel III, the court
reaffirmed its commitment to upholding the constitutional re-
quirement of regional (as opposed to purely local) planning.220
It drew on similarities between the Fair Housing Act and other
state acts such as The Coastal Area Facility Review Act,2' The
Pinelands Protection Act,2 and The Hackensack Meadowlands
Reclamation and Development Act2 in its regional approach to
the question of appropriate land use? 4 Signaling that regional
planning was the way of the future, the court stated, "[The
Act's] statewide scope is an extensive departure from the un-
planned and uncoordinated municipal growth of the past. '225
In response to charges of sabotage from critics of the Fair
Housing Act, the court stated that as long as COAH pursued
Mount Laurel obligations with determination and skill, the
administrative agency was preferable to court enacted reme-
dies.226
After Mount Laurel III, the New Jersey courts continue to
reaffirm the validity of RCAs. For example, in A QN Associates,
Inc. v. Township of Florence227 the Superior Court held that
RCAs are "bondable" municipal expenditures? 28 Most recently,
in In re Township of Warren, 9 the Supreme Court held that a
municipality cannot limit its housing to its own residents, even
if half of its "fair share" is in another municipality as a result
of entering into a RCA.?0 The court found that allowing a
are a sorely needed source of housing money for cities. In 1990, RCAs
represented 13% of low-moderate housing units approved for certification by
COAH for municipalities seeking to comply with their Mount Laurel obliga-
tions. Housing plans approved by the state in 1990 called for $43 million to
be spent in older urban areas. Alan Sipress, Despite Ruling, Affordable Homes
Still Scarce in N.J. PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 25, 1990, at Al.
219. 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
220. Id. at 643 ("[I]t is the goal of Mount Laurel I [to provide] a realistic
opportunity for lower income housing by the combined actions of the various
governments in the state of New Jersey, leading to a satisfaction of the
statewide need.").
221. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§13:19-1 to -21 (West 1991).
222. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§13:18A-1 to -49 (West 1991).
223. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§13:17-1 to -86 (West 1991).
224. 510 A.2d at 632.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 591 A.2d 995 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
228. Id. at 999.
229. 622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993).
230. Id. at 1274.
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municipality to exclude the region's poor "collides with the basic
goals of the Fair Housing Act." 231
Cases after Mount Laurel II show an interesting shift in focus.
In Mount Laurel 1, the court introduced the concept of region-
alism to limit the power of developing municipalities to erect
barriers to the poor and the middle class. In Mount Laurel II,
the court went one step further and recognized the constitutional
duty of all communities, developing or not, to accept a regional
fair share of low and moderate-income housing. In Mount
Laurel III and later cases, the court ceded power to the legis-
lature to implement a state wide planning agenda. The issue has
changed from "why regionalism?" - to "how regionalism?"
f. The Mount Laurel Doctrine Outside of New Jersey
No other state has had the courage (some might say temer-
ity)232 to go as far as the New Jersey courts or legislature on
this issue. While courts or legislatures in New Hampshire,233
Connecticut, 234 New York,235 Pennsylvania, 23 6 California, 237 Mas-
231. Id. at 1277. While a local preference might be allowed in some narrow
circumstances, the court stated that such a tool could not be allowed to defeat
the purpose of the Fair Housing Act. Id.
232. McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements, supra note 49, at 679.
233. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (N.H. 1991)
(holding zoning ordinance unconstitutional, but declining to adopt the Mount
Laurel formula); Stoney Brook Development Corp. v. Town of Fremont, 474
A.2d 561 (N.H. 1984) (striking down growth control ordinance); Knee v.
Town of Atkinson (alternatively captioned Soares v. Town of Atkinson), No.
E-36-80 (N.H. Master Oct. 26, 1984). Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d
847, 852 (N.H. 1978) (upholding town ordinance only as a "temporary
emergency measure."). See also Payne, Mount Laurel Goes National, supra
note 168, at 63 (discussing Knee holding).
234. Rinaldi v. Zoning & Planning Comm., No. CV 87-03314925, 1990 WL"
269380 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 29, 1990) (upholding denial of zoning change
by Zoning & Planning Commission).
235. See Asian Americans v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1988) (upholding
city incentive zoning ordinance); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.26
236, 243 (N.Y. 1975) ("[It is quite anomalous that a court should be required
to perform the tasks of a regional planner."). But see Suffolk Housing Serv.
v. Town of Brookhaven, 511 N.E.2d 67, 71 (N.Y. 1987) ("[W]e decline to
take the legislative action urged by plaintiffs.").
236. West v. Township Supervisors, 513 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Commw. 1986)
(voiding ordinance prohibiting mobile home parks); Fernley v. Board of
Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 1985) (holding "fair share" analysis
inapplicable to basic types of housing); Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Township
of Concord, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970) (rejecting attempt to justify exclusionary
zoning with claims of sewerage problems); National Land and Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965) (holding a four acre minimum lot requirement
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sachusetts, 23s and Oregon 239 have addressed the issue of exclu-
sionary zoning and need for regionally focused answers to the
provision of low and moderate income housing, all have stopped
short of implementing a widescale plan like the one in New
Jersey.m Some commentators were surprised at other states'
hesitancy to follow New Jersey. 241 The power of politics, how-
ever, cannot be stressed too forcefully. If citizens, legislators,
and judges realize the increasing importance of regional inter-
dependence to promote regional growth, however, the political
impediments would diminish. In fact, in New Jersey, the same
"revolutionary" Mount Laurel Doctrine that was called com-
munistic is now accepted as the norm. 242
VI. BUILDING ON THE MOUNT LAUREL DOCTRINE
In several areas, the Mount Laurel Doctrine can serve as a
paradigm for fostering regional sharing of the burdens of pov-
erty-related expenditures. 243 These areas include: delineating the
constitutional underpinning for regional (as opposed to purely
local) zoning; formulating regional fair share; using the judiciary
to overcome political resistance of legislators; and testing forms
of legislation (most notably RCAs) that would effectuate re-
gional sharing of expenditures.
A. Constitutional Issues
The heart of the Mount Laurel Doctrine is the idea that the
general welfare clause in the state constitution encompasses the
unconstitutional); Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977)
(reversing denial of variance to apartment building).
237. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§65580-65589.8 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994)
(establishing a framework "lbo assure that counties and cities recognize their
responsibilities in contributing to the attainment of the state housing goal");
Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,
557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (upholding zoning ordinance, despite its possible
unconstitutional vagueness).
238. MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 40B §§20-23 (West 1994) (applying to low
and moderate income housing-commonly referred to as the "Anti-Snob
Zoning Law").
239. OR. REv. STAT. §§197.005-197.850 (1994).
240. For a detailed discussion of activity in other states see McDougall,
Litigation to Legislation, supra note 163 at 631-35, 642-50.
241. See, e.g., Payne, Mount Laurel Goes National, supra note 168, at 62.
242. Buchsbaum, supra note 168, at 17.
243. The Mount Laurel Doctrine is not an end, but a beginning. In the
face of extreme political pressure, a legal framework was developed painstak-
ingly to establish a constitutional method for regional sharing of the burden
of low income housing. The next step is to apply the lessons of Mount Laurel
to local spending for wider social problems, such as health care and crime,
which are linked to poverty.
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general welfare of all the citizens of the state - not just the
citizens of each local municipality. 2" This "general welfare"
constitutional argument has been affirmed in New Jersey and
followed by courts in other states.245
Through devices such as exclusionary zoning, suburbs have
improperly insulated themselves from the poor and the burdens
of poverty-related expenditures. 246 Exclusionary zoning imposes
an unfair burden on the rest of citizens of the state who reside
outside of the excluding municipality. By imposing a dispropor-
tionate share of poverty-related expenditures on other citizens
of the region municipalities with exclusionary zoning violates
the general welfare clauses of state constitutions. 247
B. Formulating Fair Share
To effectuate regional redistribution, states must develop a
formula to determine the fair share of poverty-related expenses
that each community in the region should carry. Calculation of
this fair share is not simply a mathematical function. As shown
by the Mount Laurel experience, it is also an intensely political
process.
1. Defining Poverty-Related Expenses
Each state will determine the poverty-related expenses to be
included in the redistribution. The definition of poverty-related
expenses will necessarily vary according to region. A poverty-
related expense in one region may not exist in another. For
example, in the colder regions of the United States, cities pay
for mandatory shelter of the homeless in freezing weather.
Additionally, health care is an expense that will vary from region
to region, depending on whether there are public health care
facilities in a city.2
244. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
245. See supra parts V.B.4.e-.f.
246. See supra notes 47-50 accompanying text (describing how exclusionary
zoning allows municipalities to ride free with respect to poverty-related ex-
penses).
247. Exclusionary zoning violates the constitutional rights to substantive
due process and equal protection of the laws of those excluded. In all three
Mount Laurel cases, the court recognized that the police power inherent in
exclusionary zoning brings into constitutional question whether the guarantees
of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws are violated.
Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 174-75; Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 208-09;
Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d at 642. Therefore, regional redistribution of
poverty-related expenses may be constitutionally mandated.
248. For a discussion of the problems associated with the placement of
public health clinics in poor neighborhoods, see, Malcolm Gladwell, Doctors
Without Bills, REAsoN, Mar. 1992, at 40.
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In addition to direct costs, poverty-related expenses should
include indirect costs, 249 such as police protection. 20 The cost of
police and corrections in America's cities is $50 billion an-
nually.Y Studies show that poor people are at a higher risk of
experiencing violent crime, than those in other socio-economic
levels. 252 When calculating poverty-related expenses, therefore,
states should consider secondary expenses such as police protec-
tion.
2. Calculating Fair Share
Once a state determines the components of poverty-related
expenses, the next step is to calculate each community in the
region's fair share of these expenses. In Mount Laurel II, the
New Jersey Supreme Court outlined the three basic components
of the fair share formula: 1) delineating regions; 2) measuring
present and prospective regional need; and 3) establishing a ratio
for distributing that need among receiving communities. 23 This
formulaic approach, however, complicated application. By dis-
puting calculations, suburban municipalities attempted to evade
their fair share.254
249. A natural question at this point is whether the cost of public education
should be a component of poverty-related expenses. The answer should be no
- at least initially. While the deleterious effects of poverty on education have
been recognized by the courts, statewide redistribution of educational expenses
is -already well underway in many jurisdictions. See Abbott v. Burke, 575
A.2d 359, 374-75 (N.J. 1990). See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 609 A.2d 1072
(Conn. 1992) (allowing judicial determination of whether the Constitution
demands a minimum level of education). But see Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities
Today v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991), modified, 606
N.Y.S.2d 44 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that New York's system of school funding
did not violate the education article of state constitution). It would be a
mistake to derail these efforts by including them in a different redistribution
effort.
Furthermore, the constitutional basis for a challenge to disparate funding
of education is wholly different than a challenge for equalizing poverty
expenditures. Unlike most poverty-related expenses, education is specifically
addressed in most state constitutions thus creating a constitutional mandate
that must be followed.
250. There is a proven relationship between poverty and increased crime.
See generally Mark M. Lanier & David L. Carter, Applying Computer Sim-
ulation to Forecast Homicide Rates, 21 J. CuMm. JusT. 467 (1993).
251. See Farrell et al., supra note 20, at 40.
252. See Dreier, supra note 2, at 1367-68 ("[Tlhe likelihood that a person
will be the victim of a crime varies dramatically depending on where he or
she lives.?').
253. 456 A.2d at 436; see also Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note
45, at 23-27 (describing each of the three components).
254. See Payne, Rethinking Fair Share, supra note 45, at 32 (asserting that
the fair share formula does not work because it makes municipal obligations
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Enactment of the Fair Housing Act and the creation of COAH
solved the methodology dilemma. 251 COAH determines the total
need for lower income housing, the regional portion of that
need, and the standards for allocating each municipality's fair
share without a cumbersome formulaic method . 56 COAH divides
the state into six regions consisting of up to four counties each,
to determine the region's and state's present and prospective
need for low and moderate income housing.257 COAH replaces
the inconsistencies of case-by-case determinations with one over-
arching state plan.
Other states can learn from New Jersey. To efficiently redis-
tribute poverty-related expenses, statewide plans are necessary.
Numberless remedies are ineffective. States must strictly calculate
fair share based upon a predetermined formula, rather than an
ad hoc numbering.
C. Role of the Judiciary Versus the Role of the Legislature
The highest obstacle to regional redistribution is political
resistance by those who will pay higher taxes. 258 Many local
politicians will oppose legislatively enacted redistribution. 2 9 The
Mount Laurel cases, however, present an illuminating example
of how the judicial system can be used as a catalyst for legislative
action.m
1. Planting the Seeds of Change
With its Mount Laurel decisions, the New Jersey Supreme
Court did not wait for legislative action. Critics of what was
considered judicial activism noted that this "intrusion of the
judiciary into the process of implementation of the housing and
easy to evade and turns off sympathizers). Cf. Payne, Mount Laurel Goes
National, supra note 168, at 66. Payne criticizes a New Hampshire court's
adoption of only generalized guidelines. Id. "Numberless remedies give so
little guidance as to what is required that even municipalities willing to comply
but under political pressure to restrain growth may opt for trivial solutions
.... [T]he court should assure that some reasonably specific statement of
the limit of the obligations is devised." Id.
255. See supra part V.F.4.d (describing the Fair Housing Act).
256. See Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d at 632, 637-42.
257. N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:27D-307 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (describing
duties of the COAH); McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation, supra note
163, at 636-37 (stating that the COAH has established six regions).
258. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (arguing that suburban-
ites resist regionalism because they want to retain control over local expendi-
tures and revenue).
259. Id.
260. See supra parts V.F.4.c-.d (describing the influence of Mount Laurel
11 on enacting the Fair Housing Act).
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land use policy is harmful because the judicial procedure is
entirely inappropriate for the administration of land use regu-
lations."' 26' The New Jersey Supreme Court responded to critics,
noting that its activism was necessary to prod the legislature
into action:262
We have been criticized for activism in this most
sensitive and controversial area. We understand that
no one wants his or her neighborhood determined by
judges. Our reasons for 'activism,' if that is what it
was, are fully set forth in Mount Laurel I. We note
only that for the many years from the day of Mount
Laurel I to the day of Mount Laurel II, there was no
activism and there was no legislation, no ordinances
and no lower income housing.263
The judiciary is a useful tool to promote legislation. The
courts can be used to start the debate on regional redistribution
of poverty-related expenses. When the legislature realizes, as in
New Jersey, that the issue will be resolved with or without them,
the natural parochial tendency to favor the status quo vanishes.
But in the meantime, the role of the judiciary will expand or
contract to meet the exigencies of the situation. In several Mount
Laurel decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court enunciated this
fluid posture:
The judicial role, however, which could decrease as a
result of legislative and executive action, necessarily
will expand to the extent that we remain virtually
alone in this field. In the absence of adequate legis-
lative and executive help, we must give meaning to
the constitutional doctrine in the cases before us
through our own devices, even if they are relatively
less suitable. 264
Reliance on the Mount Laurel form of judicial activism is not
a call for judicially created legislation. Rather, it is a signal to
the legislature that their inaction is not the deathknell of regional
redistribution. The Mount Laurel Doctrine is "less a prescription
for judicial management of the exclusionary zoning problem,
than it is a challenge to the political side of government to deal
with it."25
261. Jerome G. Rose, New Jersey Enacts a Fair Housing Law, 14 REAL
EST. L.J. 195, 211-12 (1986).
262. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
263. Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d 132 at 154.
264. Id. at 634 (quoting Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417-18).
265. Payne, Mount Laurel Goes National, supra note 168, at 69.
[Vol. 47:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/2
REDISTRIBUTING URBAN POVERTY
2. Legislative Initiatives
Legislative action is the surest foundation upon which to build
regional redistribution. New Jersey's Fair Housing Act has been
called a textbook illustration of the proper function of a legis-
lature. It created an administrative structure to handle resource
allocation questions that the courts previously handled by de-
fault. 26
The New Jersey Supreme Court immediately recognized the
legitimacy of the Fair Housing Act as the natural extension of
the doctrine promulgated in Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel
II, and ceded its power to the legislature to implement a state-
wide planning agenda.267 This passing of the legislative baton is
an important lesson for further redistribution efforts. For while
the judiciary may have to take the initial steps for formulating
the policy of redistribution, judicial activism is not the goal,
but rather a means to the end of sound, legislatively established
social policy. The evolution of events in New Jersey highlights
the importance of positive government to remedy fiscal imbal-
ance.m
D. Regional Contribution Agreements
Regional redistribution of poverty-related expenses can also
follow the methodology contained in the New Jersey Fair Hous-
ing Act, allowing for the creation of Regional Contribution
Agreements.m RCAs have been criticized on two fronts: 1) they
do not provide for payment for infrastructure or other devel-
opment costs; 270 and 2) cities may be so desperate for cash, that
they will accept a less advantageous deal than they would if
bargaining power between cities and suburbs was equal.27' In
the case of regional redistribution of poverty-related expenses,
however, neither criticism is applicable.
266. Id. at 69-70.
267. Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d at 648.
268. Professor McDougall states: "New Jersey's administrative scheme dem-
onstrates the importance and viability of 'positive government.' The costs of
industrial development generated under a 'laissez-faire' regime remain long
after society has enjoyed the benefits. Positive government thus becomes a
necessity, not only to make repairs but to set a course which embodies people's
needs." McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation, supra note 163, at 651.
269. N.J. STAT. ANN. §52:27D-312 (West 1986).
270. See McDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements, supra note 49, at
683 (suggesting that cities may accept poor residents without demanding enough
money, thus worsening the housing situation).
271. See id. at 682-83, 689 (pointing to the "pattern of metropolitan
settlement and the history of suburbanization" that "puts the suburbs in a
position to make 'rational' decisions and the cities to make desperate ones").
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Unlike payment solely for housing, which the New Jersey
RCAs address, poverty-related expenses would not have an
infrastructure expense component. If an expense is linked to
poverty, then that expense is included. If the state agency
determines that an expense is not linked to poverty, it is not
included.
More importantly, in response to the concern over the superior
bargaining advantage of the suburbs, in this model the level of
regional redistribution of poverty-related expenses would not be
discretionary. A city could not be forced into a less advantageous
deal, because the state determines the amount and location of
the funds to be redistributed.
The use of state administered regional contribution agreements
also responds to suburban concern over the city's ability to
manage its finances. While some have come to the defense of
city government in response to charges of fiscal mismanage-
ment, 272 others have noted the suburban recalcitrance to pour
more money into an inefficient political system. 273 State oversight
of the money will assure suburban residents that the redistri-
bution efforts will not be fiscally mismanaged by the city.
VII. CONCLUSION
The expense of poverty is not a city problem, a priori. It is
a city problem because the poor of a given metropolitan region
are not allowed to live outside the city. Payment for poverty-
related expenses is a regional problem that demands a regional
solution.
Regional redistribution of poverty related expenses through a
state agency is a win-win proposition. It maintains the suburban
desire for political and economic separation from the city while
acknowledging that such a separation has a cost. This cost is
the redistribution that flows back to the city because it bears a
disproportionate burden of poverty-related expenses.
272. See Dreier, America's Urban Crisis, supra note 2, at 1372 (citing
HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER AMERICA's AILINo CmIEs: FIscAL HEALTH
AND THE DESIGN OF U"BAN POLICY 292 (1991).
273. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/v l47/iss1/2
